On “The Lure of Strike” by Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.
This commentary is in response to the special commentary, “The Lure of  Strike” by 
Conrad Crane published in the Summer 2013 issue of  Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2).
As an admirer of  Dr. Conrad Crane, it genuinely saddens me to see his new essay, “The Lure of  Strike.” Here we have a distinguished historian becoming, in essence, an “interservice 
hit man,” and chief  spokesperson for the Army’s small but burgeoning 
neo-Luddite wing. Regrettably, his essay sounds too much like that of  a 
1930’s cavalryman fulminating against the internal combustion that was 
altering the way the Army would fight wars.
Dr. Crane starts by expressing the belief that because of what he 
seems to think is a nefarious Air Force, America suffers from the delu-
sion that technology inevitably produces what he calls “short, tidy wars 
with limited landpower commitments.” Where he gets this notion isn’t 
clear. The Air Force, which sandwiched a decade of no-fly zone enforce-
ment marked by hundreds of Iraqi anti-aircraft engagements between 
years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly does not view conflict 
that way. Nor does the general public, whose rejection of stand-off 
strikes against Syria is ample evidence that it has no illusions about the 
potential unintended consequences of any use of force.
Regardless, defending Army force structure is plainly the raison d’être 
of Crane’s piece. Indeed, “The Lure of Strike” is reducible to a simple 
syllogism: if technological developments allow for “short, tidy wars with 
limited landpower commitments” then that will inevitably mean (in his 
thinking) a smaller Army. To him, a smaller Army is, ipso facto, bad. 
Ergo, technology is bad. Classic Neo-Ludditism.
Exactly why Dr. Crane is not advocating that the Army develop its 
own method for conducting “short, tidy wars with limited landpower 
commitments” is also unclear. After all, such conflicts would limit the 
risk to America’s most precious resource: her sons and daughters and, 
particularly, those in Army uniforms. It is especially baffling given that 
a weary Army is just emerging from exactly the opposite: long, untidy 
wars with massive manpower commitments that produced results most 
charitably described by Army Colonel Gian Gentile as “unsatisfying.”
Unfortunately, Dr. Crane does not attempt to bring to bear his 
formidable skills as a historian to address some of the very questions 
that have spurred the nation’s search for the technology-based alterna-
tives that he rails against. For example, why is it that the best-trained, 
best-equipped, and most valorous army in the history of warfare was, 
nevertheless, unable to fully defeat the largely uneducated and lightly-
armed tribesmen it significantly outnumbered and wildly outgunned?
Moreover, why did the Army, as it implemented its manpower-
intensive strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, ignore a fundamental lesson 
of COIN history, that is, that the most powerful insurgent recruitment 
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tool is not, as some narratives would have it, the use of high-technology 
means (such as stand-off strike), but rather the physical presence of 
foreign troops? Should not the Army ask itself why its leaders repeat-
edly characterized its warfighting mission as “protecting the Afghan 
(or Iraqi) people” when the actual assignment was about protecting the 
American people as Congress’ Authorization to Use Military Force made 
crystal clear?
And even among those Soldiers who did grasp the true mission, 
why did so many think that the way to go about it was to try to turn 
infantrymen armed with high school degrees into social workers, civil 
engineers, nurses, schoolteachers, and boy scouts as Dr. Crane’s COIN 
doctrine importuned? And then give them the Sisyphean task to trans-
form hostile, ancient cultures into pacific, Westernized societies? Even 
if that scheme somehow could work, did they not realize that al Qaeda 
would easily outflank it by decamping to Pakistan, Yemen, and North 
Africa—not to mention burrowing into urban areas around the globe?
Instead of grappling with those substantive questions of recent 
history, Dr. Crane launches a lengthy and startlingly venomous attack on 
America’s most high-tech force, the United States Air Force. According 
to Crane, not only does airpower fail at every turn, it is Airmen who 
are disingenuously and deceptively corrupting the national security dia-
logue. Of course, these hackneyed myths have been rebutted repeatedly, 
but picking apart the many flaws and omissions in Dr. Crane’s rendi-
tion is actually unnecessary. In fact, his essay amply illustrates the limits 
of the historian’s art when it comes to the technology of war. It really 
doesn’t matter, for example, what airpower could or could not do during 
World War II or, for that matter, yesterday, as the only thing that really 
counts is what it can do today.
And that is plenty. As the President and others have come to learn 
from material found in bin Laden’s lair and elsewhere, what America’s 
most dangerous enemies fear the most is not chai-drinking soldiers, 
female engagement teams, or even masses of infantrymen lumbering 
about in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, but rather being 
relentlessly hunted by high-tech surveillance and strike platforms. 
Of course, no one believes that stand-off, precision strike is always 
the answer, but—sometimes—it can be. As Tom Ricks’s book Fiasco 
reports, 1998’s Operation Desert Fox—a few days of air and missile 
strikes—effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear weapons’ program. David 
Kay, the former United Nations arms inspector, said that after the 
strikes the Iraqi weapons programs “withered away, and never got 
momentum again.”
America is a technological nation, and the Army ought to embrace 
and celebrate that fact even if it means changes. Yet as a developer of 
robotic ground vehicles told The New York Times, “there is a resistance to 
new technologies being introduced in and around soldiers.” Although 
infantrymen are hardly obsolete, their numbers and employment strat-
egy is—and should be—reevaluated because of what technology can 
now offer.
The Army needs to calm itself. Everyone whose opinions anyone 
should care about knows America needs a robust and dominant Army. 
There is, in fact, a powerful case to be made for such an Army, but it 
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is not one premised on denigrating another service, or—especially—
suggesting that technology does not and cannot change the calculus of 
warfighting. In short, our Army must resist “the lure of Neo-Ludditism.”
The Author Replies
Conrad C. Crane
I assume that MG Dunlap, like myself, was under a time crunch to get his submission into the journal, so I will accept the possibility that he might not have had time to read my article thoroughly. After 
acknowledging the important role of  airpower in the American Way of  
War, my intent was to ensure policymakers do not expect too much of  it. 
They must retain the full range of  capabilities of  the joint force to keep 
all military options open. As has been apparent in recent Congressional 
testimony by the service chiefs, they are all concerned that precipitous 
cuts in force structure will threaten capabilities necessary to preserve 
national security. I am equally concerned about exorbitant claims that 
cyber capabilities will be able to plug the gaps.
I was rather appalled by MG Dunlap’s assault on the Army’s record 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is not enough space in this issue to allow 
me to address that in much detail. While that might be a topic worth a 
full issue of the Quarterly in the future, it will also be debated in a wave 
of historical works to come. Much of his opinion is rooted in his well-
known opposition to FM 3-24, and the counterinsurgency operations it 
proposed. He makes the common error of attacking the tool of COIN, 
rather than the strategies and policies it supported. Decisionmakers 
need to have a full toolbox to address security interests. Sometimes 
necessary approaches will be highly kinetic, but MG Dunlap’s disdain 
for nonkinetic solutions is apparent. He remains convinced you can 
fight these kinds of wars from 20,000 feet. He argues that large land 
force presence always has a self-defeating backlash, ignoring the fact 
that the Afghan president’s most vociferous complaints to commanders 
were about the perceived excesses of airpower, not too many Soldiers 
or Marines. No topic causes more concern among the international 
students at the Army War College than the issue of drone strikes, which 
might be good counterterrorism for us, but are often detrimental to 
counterinsurgency efforts in targeted countries, and can create more 
enemies in the long run.
I must agree with MG Dunlap that the widespread reluctance to 
engage in air attacks against Syria is a positive sign that the limitations 
of technology are being considered by decision makers, though the full 
scenario has still to unfold. At the same time the complexity of that 
situation, and these recognized technological shortcomings, highlight 
the necessity for a wide range of options to be available for policy 
makers.  Meaningful land force commitments are obviously a last resort, 
but having that capability reassures allies, gives adversaries pause, and 
adds to the menu of possible solutions to apply to difficult problem sets, 
especially as potential allies also reduce their military force structure 
